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The passage of Arizona's Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act' (SB 1070) has exposed an intriguing characteristic
of the current debate over illegal immigration. The recent immigration
debate has been conducted, as most national debates are, through the
national discourse in newspapers, television broadcasts, and
congressional debates. Unlike in most national debates, however,
opposing sides of this debate have also demonstrated their discontent
by passing state and local laws intended to modify the extent to which
federal immigration law-an area of law in which "formulation of
policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress"2 -is enforced.
Governments that consider federal immigration law too harsh have
expressed their disagreement by passing "sanctuary" laws, which
withhold local assistance in the enforcement of the federal law. Those
seeking more stringent immigration policies, in contrast, have passed
laws (such as SB 1070) directing local authorities to enforce federal
immigration laws even when the federal government would not. In
other words, state and local governments create jurisdictions of under-
and overenforcement' depending on their policy preferences. These
actions have caused the immigration debate to evolve into a unique
question about the appropriate scope and role of states in enforcing
federal immigration law, rather than (as one might expect) on federal
spending, enforcement, or immigration policy. Paradoxically, state
t BS 2007, North Carolina State University; JD Candidate 2012, The University of
Chicago Law School.
1 2010 Ariz Sess Laws 113, as amended by Immigration and Border Security; Providing for
Conditional Enactment, 2010 Ariz Sess Laws 211.
2 Galvan v Press,347 US 522,531 (1954).
3 The use of "underenforcement" or "overenforcement" is not meant to suggest any
normative conclusion. Such normative questions are beyond the scope of this Comment. Instead,
these terms simply denote enforcement below or above an actual or possible middle ground. For
the purposes of this Comment, this middle ground is the level of enforcement currently pursued
by the federal government. Thus, overenforcement would include statutes like SB 1070, and
underenforcement would include sanctuary ordinances passed in jurisdictions such as San
Francisco or New York City.
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actions, rather than federal ones, are thus driving a debate about an
area of law that the federal government has the exclusive authority to
determine.
This Comment contributes to the contemporary debate by
drawing lessons from the antebellum controversy over fugitive slaves,
which shares two unique characteristics with today's immigration
debate. First, the terms of the debate in both disputes take the form of
questions of state enforcement. Second, both cases center on the
status of individuals whose presence in those states is illegal under
federal law. These similarities make it possible to use the fugitive slave
debate and its central case, Prigg v Pennsylvania,' to inform the
modern question of what role states can serve in enforcing federal
immigration law by arresting, detaining, and prosecuting federal law-
a question currently being litigated in United States v Arizona,' in
which the United States government has brought suit to enjoin
enforcement of SB 1070. As will be shown, this is a question that
recent case law has left unresolved but is one that the antebellum
fugitive slave debate and Prigg are well suited to address.
Though the fugitive slave debate does prove informative, there is
little evidence that the parties or the courts have considered it to be
so. This is likely because-though Prigg has not been overturned-it is
often read to apply only to the antebellum slavery debate.' One of the
central purposes of this Comment is to show that Prigg, as one of the
first preemption cases, has implications outside the slavery context
and can be particularly informative with regard to the current
immigration debate.
Part I of this Comment provides a basic outline of the current
immigration debate to show how varied levels of enforcement occupy
a central place in the debate. Part II gives a more detailed account of
the fugitive slave debate before and after the Supreme Court's Prigg
decision, demonstrating that a similar debate regarding under- and
4 41 US (16 Pet) 539 (1842).
5 No CV10-1413-PHX-SRB (D Ariz), appeal of preliminary injunction order available at
703 F Supp 2d 980 (D Ariz 2010), affd, 641 F3d 339 (9th Cir 2011).
6 Most recently, the Court utilized Prigg to help determine the intent of Congress in
enacting civil rights legislation following the Civil War. See Jett v Dallas Independent School
District, 491 US 701, 726-29 (1989) (plurality). Prigg was also cited in dissent in Haywood v
Drown, 129 S Ct 2108 (2009), as informative to the question of whether the federal government
can require state courts to hear federal causes of action. Id at 2131 n 8 (Thomas dissenting).
Undoubtedly, one reason courts have not frequently cited to Prigg is that relying on lessons
taken from the debate on slavery is obviously unsettling. This Comment certainly does not seek
to imbue slavery with any degree of legitimacy or convey any sense of approval for the practice.
The goal here is only to draw on lessons about the relationship between states and the federal
government from a period when questions about the relationship were identical to those asked
today.
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overenforcement took place in the antebellum era. Part III then
demonstrates that the two unique characteristics that these debates
share-the terms of debate and the legal question regarding
enforcement of a federal status-allow the fugitive slave debate to
inform the immigration debate. Part IV will use this analogy to show
that though the reasoning of Prigg supports the constitutionality of
laws like SB 1070, the consequences of Prigg demonstrate that
SB 1070 should be found unconstitutional because laws like it in the
past have had disastrous consequences for the vitality of federal law.
The Comment will conclude by first analyzing the channeling
characteristic' of the debates to better understand when this occurs
and what effect it has on a debate's scope. This understanding will
then be used to show that the Court should adopt a narrowly tailored
resolution when legal questions that arise from debates of this nature
are before it.
I. UNITED STATES VARIZONA AND THE CURRENT
IMMIGRATION DEBATE
The immigration policies of the United States have been heavily
contested over the past several years. Though this debate is extensive,
this Comment seeks only to fully explore the debate over the proper
level of state involvement in enforcing federal immigration law. This
Part will first demonstrate the central role that state-level
enforcement plays in the debate surrounding recent immigration
reform efforts. State participation in the immigration debate, in light
of federal inaction, will then be analyzed to show how states and
municipalities have expressed discontent with federal policies by
adjusting their levels of assistance in enforcing those policies. Finally,
the discussion will discuss the legal questions at issue in Arizona,
which brings the dispute about enforcement to the forefront.
7 "Channeling" is a short-hand term for the idea articulated by Arthur Bestor that the
Constitution serves an important role of shaping national debates in ways that are not always
immediately apparent. See Arthur Bestor, The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis,
69 Am Hist Rev 327, 328-30 (1964). In the antebellum era, he argues, the "configurative role" of
the Constitution focused the slavery debate leading up to the Civil War on a relatively narrow
dispute over the expansion of slavery into the territories, rather than on the evils of slavery. See
id at 329, 338-41. This Comment argues that the configurative function of the Constitution has
narrowed debate over immigration to one regarding states' roles in enforcement, rather than one
about the immigration system itself. That is, the immigration debate has been "channeled" into a
narrower question about states' roles in enforcement.
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A. Enforcement as a Central Aspect of Recent Efforts to Reform
Immigration Laws
The most recent attempt at comprehensive immigration reform
was the effort to enact both the Comprehensive Immigration Reform
Act of 2007' and A Bill to Provide for Comprehensive Immigration
Reform and for Other Purposes! The debate over these bills
encompassed numerous immigration-related issues, but the question
of the importance of enforcement became a flash point. Opponents of
the bills argued that a comprehensive approach was a mistake because
past experience demonstrates that the federal government lacks the
will to enforce immigration law.'o Supporters, however, argued that
enforcement was only one part of a broader solution needed to
resolve more fundamental problems with immigration law-problems
evidenced by the millions of immigrants in the country who have
violated it." Underlying the debates over both bills was an awareness
that many state and local governments were beginning to craft their
own solutions for internal enforcement.12 Despite apparent consensus
that something should be done to improve the immigration system,
comprehensive immigration reform twice failed to pass in the Senate.
Since this most recent attempt at comprehensive immigration
reform, the debate has largely continued along the same lines, with
differences about enforcement playing a central role.4 On the national
level, Congress has mostly avoided discussion of broad reform and
8 S 1348, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (May 9, 2007).
9 S 1639, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (June 18,2007).
10 See 153 Cong Rec S 8644 (June 28,2007) (Sen Dole) (stating that the American people
need proof that the federal government has control of the border given the government's "track
record of total failure"). See also 153 Cong Rec S 8582-83 (June 27, 2007) (Sen Bond)
(describing the Bond Amendment, which sought to eliminate provisions in the comprehensive
reform effort that provided a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants).
"1 See 153 Cong Rec at S 8583 (Sen Specter) (cited in note 10) (praising the bill as
recognizing that "enforcement alone will not work to secure our border and meet the needs of
the U.S. economy"). See also id at S 8583-84 (Sen Salazar) (describing groups supporting strict
enforcement as "being unrealistic" because of the high practical costs such a solution would
involve and the human costs the current system imposes); id at S 8582 (Sen Bond).
12 See id at S 8526 (Sen Kennedy) ("States and cities are starting to step in and solve their
immigration problems in their own way, regardless of the national interest. We cannot let that
happen.").
13 See 153 Cong Rec S 7279 (June 7, 2007) (rejecting the motion to end debate for S 1348
by a vote of thirty-four in the affirmative, sixty-one in the negative, and four abstentions. See also
153 Cong Rec at S 8650-51 (cited in note 10) (rejecting the motion to end debate on S 1639 by a
vote of forty-six in the affirmative, fifty-three in the negative, and one abstention).
14 See Devin Dwyer, President Obama Prods Republicans in Speech on Comprehensive
Immigration Reform, ABC News (July 1, 2010), online at http-1/abcnews.go.com/Politics/obama-
renews-push-comprehensive-immigration-reform/story?id=11062758 (visited Aug 29, 2011)
(reporting on a July 2010 speech made by President Barack Obama urging comprehensive
reform and on Republicans' response emphasizing enforcement and border security).
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focused on narrower aspects of immigration reform." State and local
governments, however, have increasingly weighed in on the debate
through laws that either undermine or enhance the enforcement of
immigration laws.
B. The Sanctuary Phenomenon: State and Municipal
Underenforcement of Immigration Law
States or cities that seek to underenforce immigration policy are
frequently referred to as "sanctuary" areas. These governments-
which include Alaska," Oregon," and many large cities in other
states1 - express their discontent with the federal immigration system
by passing laws that prohibit local authorities from assisting federal
immigration law enforcement." San Francisco, for example, is
frequently considered a sanctuary city because of the city's 1989
refuge ordinance,20 which prohibits city funds from being used "to
assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law or to gather or
disseminate information regarding the immigration status of
individuals in the City and County of San Francisco."1 This ordinance,
as well as others like it, prohibits local law enforcement from checking
the immigration status of people they arrest or from forwarding that
information to federal authorities. This in turn creates an area of
underenforcement because federal authorities lack access to and the
cooperation of local resources they frequently rely on to identify and
detain illegal aliens.2
Opponents of sanctuary policies have sought to eliminate these
areas of underenforcement through federal law. The Personal
15 See, for example, S 3992, 111th Cong, 2d Sess (Nov 30, 2010) (providing illegal aliens
who entered the United States as children a path to legal residence if they attend college).
16 See Alaska HR J Res 22, 23d Leg, 1st Sess (2003).
17 See Or Rev Stat § 181.850.
18 See Lisa M. Seghetti, Stephen R. Vina, and Karma Ester, Enforcing Immigration Law:
The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement 26 n 85 (CRS Aug 14,2006) (listing Los Angeles,
California; San Diego, California; San Francisco, California; Baltimore, Maryland; Detroit,
Michigan; Minneapolis, Minnesota; New York, New York; Houston, Texas; and Seattle,
Washington, as sanctuary cities).
19 Yule Kim and Michael John Garcia, "Sanctuary Cities": Legal Issues 2 (CRS Jan 9,2008).
20 City of Refuge Ordinance, Ordinance 375-89, codified at City and County of San
Francisco Municipal Code ch 12H.
21 City and County of San Francisco Municipal Code § 12H.2. The local importance of the
Act was reiterated in Gavin Newsom, Executive Directive 07-01 (Mar 1, 2007) (requiring local
departments to ensure their compliance with the 1989 City of Refuge Ordinance).
22 See Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U Chi Legal F 57,
72 (2007) ("Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that where enforcement against criminal aliens is
concerned ... federal immigration officials are practically impotent without the substantial help
of the state and local criminal justice systems.").
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Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 199623
(Welfare Reform Act) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act of 199624 (IIRIRA) both, for instance,
prohibit any law restricting state and local authorities from sharing
immigration information with federal immigration authorities.2 More
recently, opponents have sought (without success) to strengthen these
provisions by restricting federal funding for local law enforcement
agencies that do not comply with the mandate to assist with
enforcement of federal immigration law.6 The efforts of state and local
governments to frustrate enforcement, and opponents' response
through federal law, demonstrate that one aspect of the immigration
debate concerns an argument over the ability of local governments to
create areas of underenforcement of federal immigration law.
C. State and Local Laws Creating Areas of Overenforcement of
Immigration Law
On the other end of the spectrum, many state and municipal
governments have enacted or are considering laws that seek to
increase enforcement of immigration laws. Perhaps the most
prominent enactment of this kind is Arizona's SB 1070, which requires
Arizona police and other government officials to enforce federal
immigration law to the "full extent permitted by federal law."27 Law
enforcement officers are required to, among other things, check the
immigration status of suspected illegal aliens during any lawful stop or
in any other circumstance in which probable cause exists that an
individual is an illegal alien." Furthermore, individual citizens are
provided a cause of action against sanctuary municipalities in Arizona
to force them to assist enforcement of federal immigration law.29
Though SB 1070 is the first law of its kind, twenty other states are
considering passing laws that imitate it." Supporters of these laws
23 Pub L No 104-193,110 Stat 2105.
24 Pub L No 104-208,110 Stat 3009-546.
25 Welfare Reform Act § 434,8 USC § 1644; IIRIRA § 642,8 USC § 1373.
26 See, for example, A Bill to Prohibit Appropriated Funds from Being Used in
Contravention of Section 642(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, S 95, 111th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 6, 2009) ("None of the amounts
appropriated in any Act for the Community Oriented Policing Services Program may be used in
contravention of [IIRIRA § 642].").
27 SB 1070 § 2, codified at Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 11-1051(A).
28 SB 1070 § 2, codified at Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 11-1051(B).
29 SB 1070 § 2, codified at Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 11-1051(H).
30 John Miller, Twenty Other States Considering Copying Arizona Immigration Law,
Huffington Post (June 25, 2010), online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/25/twenty-
other-states-consi n_626095.html (visited Aug 29,2011). See also Julia Preston, Political Battle on
Immigration Shifts to States, NY Times Al (Jan 1,2011) (describing the expected increase in state
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contend that they are motivated by the federal government's failure to
fully enforce immigration law." Accordingly, the laws are thought by
these supporters to further a policy of "cooperative enforcement" by
working concurrently with federal law to "discourage and deter the
unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by
persons unlawfully present in the United States."32 The practical effect
of these laws is to create jurisdictions where federal immigration law
is enforced to a greater extent than in other jurisdictions.
Opponents of these laws have challenged SB 1070 as preempted
by federal law. Suits were filed by several parties, the most prominent
of which is the federal government's challenge in Arizona. The
essence of the argument made by the federal government is that
SB 1070 infringes on the federal government's exclusive authority
over immigration policy, which prevents a state from "establish[ing] an
independent state enforcement scheme outside federal control."" The
government argues that allowing states to create overenforcement
schemes, even if the state "merely" enforces federal law, interferes
with the balance reached by the federal government and thus with its
ability to speak with one voice on an issue of international relations.
Arizona contends, however, that SB 1070 is not preempted because it
corresponds with congressional intent "to encourage the assistance
from state and local law enforcement officers in the enforcement of
federal immigration laws,"" and because it doesn't impose additional
burdens on immigrants.
legislation designed to crack down on illegal immigration). Many other state and local
governments have also passed laws that seek to increase restrictions on illegal immigrants
through separate state remedies that imitate federal law rather than "simply" enforce it as
SB 1070 does. See Lozano v City of Hazleton, 620 F3d 170,177-80,224 (3d Cir 2010), petition for
cert filed, 79 USLW 3370 (Dec 8, 2010) (describing two ordinances passed by the City of
Hazleton that regulated the employment of and rentals to illegal immigrants, and finding them
preempted by federal immigration law).
31 See, for example, Arizona Governor Janice K. Brewer, Letter to President Barack
Obama *3 (June 23, 2010), online at http://azgovernor.gov/dms/uploadlPR_062410
LettertoPresidentObama.pdf (visited Aug 29,2011) ("[T]he single most significant factor behind
the passage this year of SB 1070... was the frustration of Arizona elected officials, and the
public we serve, regarding the failure of the federal government over the years to effectively
address the problem of illegal immigration.").
32 See SB 1070 § 1.
33 Brief for Appellee, United States v Arizona, No 10-16645, *23-26 (9th Cir filed Sept 23,
2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 5162512) ("US Appellate Brief').
34 See id at *24--25, 28.
35 Appellants' Opening Brief, United States v Arizona, No 10-16645, *27,29-30 (9th Cir filed
Aug 26,2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 5162518) ("Arizona Appellate Opening Brief').
36 Id at *28-29 (distinguishing factually Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52 (1941), on grounds
that SB 1070 does not impose additional burdens on immigrants, unlike the Pennsylvania Alien
Registration Act of 1939, which was found to be preempted in Hines).
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The current immigration debate has thus evolved in an
interesting way-through variations in the level of enforcement of
federal law by state and local authorities. Localities that consider the
current federal laws too harsh pass laws that forbid local authorities
from assisting in their execution, thus creating areas of
underenforcement; those localities that think that the current laws are
not sufficiently enforced pass laws requiring local law enforcement to
engage in activities typically performed by federal authorities, thus
creating areas of overenforcement. This type of debate is unusual
because states do not typically play such a crucial role in the
enforcement of federal laws, much less one that enables them to
express their views on those federal laws by adjusting their levels of
enforcement. But this debate is not without precedent, as the discussion
of the antebellum fugitive slave debate below will demonstrate.
II. PRIGG V PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FUGITIVE SLAVE DEBATE
The immigration debate is not the first time that a national
controversy has manifested itself through varied levels of enforcement
of federal law. The debate surrounding the return of runaway slaves to
their owners-one of the central aspects of the antebellum slavery
controversy-took place primarily in the same manner. This Part will
begin by explaining the contours of the fugitive slave debate before
the Supreme Court's decision in Prigg v Pennsylvania. It will then
summarize Prigg and discuss how the Court attempted to resolve the
debate by establishing the duties and responsibilities of local, state,
and the federal governments in enforcing the federal law requiring the
return of fugitive slaves. Finally, this Part will show how the Court's
decision failed to resolve the fugitive slave debate but increased
sectional tensions by providing Northern states the ability to render
federal law requiring the return of fugitive slaves effectively
unenforceable.
A. The Fugitive Slave Debate before Prigg v Pennsylvania
The Fugitive Slave Clause in the United States Constitution
required that escaped slaves be returned to their owners." In 1793,
37 US Const Art IV, § 2, cl 3:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due.
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Congress passed the first Fugitive Slave Act," which implemented the
clause by providing procedures for returning slaves to their owners.
The Act allowed slave owners to seize an alleged slave without prior
judicial or law enforcement approval; it required the owner only to
present the alleged slave before a judge in order to receive a
certification of removal, which would be provided so long as the
person seeking the removal swore that the individual was a slave."
This meant that alleged slaves had essentially no procedural
protections, since courts relied on slave owners' word as evidence, and
the removal order was rarely reconsidered once the slave was brought
back to the owner's state.4
These minimal procedural protections were of particular concern
for the Northern states. These states feared that the absence of greater
protections would result in free African Americans being seized and
brought south, where they would be unable to prove that they were
actually free individuals.41 The Northern states took two steps to abate
these concerns: they challenged the constitutionality of the 1793
Fugitive Slave Act, and they passed personal liberty laws.
Northern states argued that the Act was unconstitutional on one
of two grounds: the Constitution did not provide Congress authority
to pass the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act, or the Act failed to provide
procedural protections required by the Fourth Amendment. Both of
these challenges failed,42 though the exact reasoning is largely specific
to the Fugitive Slave Act and therefore outside the scope of this
Comment. The challenges did not acknowledge the growing divide in
enforcement of the Act that later became a central flash point of the
debate.
abrogated by US Const Amend XIII.
38 Act of Feb 12,1793 ("1793 Fugitive Slave Act"), ch 7, 1 Stat 302 (Feb 12,1793).
39 1793 Fugitive Slave Act § 3, 1 Stat at 302-05.
40 See Thomas D. Morris, Free Men All: The Personal Liberty Laws of the North,
1780-1861 44 (Johns Hopkins 1974) (recounting a Pennsylvania legislator's account of the
procedural protections afforded to fugitive slaves and the minimal judicial review provided in
Southern courts).
41 See id at 32,44-45.
42 Courts found that Congress had power to act under the Necessary and Proper Clause in
order to make the Fugitive Slave Clause effective. See, for example, Wright v Deacon, 5 Serg &
Rawle 62, 63 (Pa 1819) (holding the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act constitutional because it was a
necessary act of Congress to make the Fugitive Slave Clause effective). See also Paul Finkelman,
Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story's Judicial
Nationalism, 1994 S Ct Rev 247, 269-72 (describing the split among state courts over the
constitutionality of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act). Courts also rejected challenges on Fourth
Amendment grounds because either slaves were not considered parties to the Constitution or
the Northern concerns about erroneous arrest of free African Americans were not readily
apparent. See Commonwealth v Griffith, 19 Mass 11, 20-21 (1823).
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The primary method that Northern states used to undermine the
Act was to pass laws designed to frustrate enforcement-even though
they were based on constitutionally questionable grounds. 43 These
Northern laws, called personal liberty laws, effectively created
jurisdictions of underenforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act. They
were designed to enhance the procedural protections that these states
felt were lacking in the Act." Lawmakers were forced to walk a fine
line to remain within what they considered the boundaries of the
states' authority under the federal Constitution. This was part of the
reason they limited themselves to increasing procedural protections,
rather than taking more drastic moves to frustrate owners' attempts to
recover fugitive slaves. 4' The practical effect of these laws, nonetheless,
was to create areas in which enforcement of the 1793 Fugitive Slave
Act was more difficult than in other jurisdictions.
An excellent example of the personal liberty laws is the
1826 Pennsylvania law at issue in Prigg.46 The law made the forceful
seizure permitted by the Fugitive Slave Act unlawful by making it a
felony to forcefully seize African Americans.4 ' To reclaim a fugitive
slave, the slave owner (or his agent) had to first apply for a warrant
from any state judge, justice of the peace, or alderman, who would
then authorize the sheriff (rather than the owner) to seize the alleged
slave.48 This warrant could be obtained only if the owner or his agent
"supported [his claim] by oath or affirmation of [the] claimant,"
"produce[d] the affidavit of the claimant of the fugitive ... in the state
or territory in which such claimant shall reside," and had that affidavit
authenticated by a court in the claimant's state of residence.49 Finally,
once the alleged slave was seized by the sheriff, the owner or agent, in
43 See Earl M. Maltz, Slavery and the Supreme Court, 1825-1861 93-94 (Kansas 2009)
(discussing a split between state courts with regard to the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave
Act, that led in turn to a divide over the constitutionality of state laws in conflict with the Act);
Morris, Free Men All at 42-56, 76-78, 88-92 (cited in note 40) (describing the efforts by
Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, and Ohio to pass personal liberty laws).
44 See Maltz, Slavery and the Supreme Court at 93-94 (cited in note 43).
45 See Morris, Free Men All at 52-56 (cited in note 40) (discussing the New York
legislators' deliberations in agreeing to a new personal liberty law).
46 Act of March 25, 1826 ("Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law"), 1825 Pa Laws ch 50
at 149 (1826). For examples of personal liberty laws from other states, see Of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, to Bring Up a Person to Testify, or to Answer in Certain Cases, 2 NY Rev Stat 559
(Albany 1829) (enacting provisions very similar to those seen in the Pennsylvania Personal
Liberty Law); Act of April 19, 1837, 1837 Mass Laws ch 221 at 240 (requiring jury trials to
determine if an alleged slave could be reclaimed by slave owners or their agents).
47 Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law §§ 1-2,1825 Pa Laws ch 50 at 150-51 (providing a
fine between $500 and $2,000, with a sentence between seven and twenty-one years, for the
forceful seizure or sale of an African American).
48 Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law § 3,1825 Pa Laws ch 50 at 151.
49 Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law §§ 3-4,1825 Pa Laws ch 50 at 151-52.
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order to obtain a certificate of removal, had to prove to the court
issuing the warrant that the individual was actually a slave owing
service to the requesting party under the laws of the state from which
the slave fled."o To ensure that these procedures were carried out
exclusively by the state courts, the Pennsylvania legislature explicitly
removed jurisdiction over the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act from state
aldermen and justices of the peace." This meant that the requirements
laid out in the state law supplemented, but did not supplant, the
federal procedural requirements with which claimants would still have
to separately comply.52
This removal of jurisdiction shows that the Pennsylvania personal
liberty law was designed to create an area of underenforcement of the
1793 Fugitive Slave Act by increasing the procedural protections for
African Americans. While the federal Act allowed an owner and his
agents to seize fugitive slaves without a warrant and obtain a
certificate of removal solely on his own oath, the Pennsylvania law
made it necessary for owners to first obtain a warrant, then wait for
the sheriff to capture the alleged slave, and then prove that the alleged
slave was in fact theirs. The practical effect of these extra procedures
was to make recapturing fugitive slaves significantly more difficult-
though certainly more fair-than under the federal Act." Unsurprisingly,
underenforcement caused by these laws led to significant tension with
Southern states,4 leading to questions about the constitutionality of the
1793 Fugitive Slave Act and Northern states' personal liberty laws. The
Court would try to resolve these questions in Prigg.
B. Prigg v Pennsylvania and the Court's Attempt to Resolve the
Fugitive Slave Debate
Prigg came before the Supreme Court in a unique way. Edward
Prigg was the appointed agent and lawyer of Maryland resident
Margaret Ashmore, who sought the return of Margaret Morgan, a
fugitive slave, in Pennsylvania." Prigg and three associates obtained a
warrant for Morgan's arrest and sought an appearance before a local
50 Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law § 6,1825 Pa Laws ch 50 at 152-53.
51 Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law § 9,1825 Pa Laws ch 50 at 153-54.
52 See Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts:Anti-slavery Use of
a Pro-slavery Decision, 25 Civil War Hist 5,7 (1979) (suggesting that a slave owner would have to
comply with state and federal removal laws in order to leave the state with a slave).
53 See id at 7-8 (describing the additional procedural provisions provided by the
Pennsylvania Personal Liberty Law as "much stricter" and placing extra burdens on owners
compared to federal law).
54 Morris, Free Men All at 59-64 (cited in note 40).
5s Prigg,41 US (16 Pet) at 608-09.
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magistrate, but the magistrate refused to hear the case.5 6 This ought to
have prevented Morgan's removal because the Pennsylvania personal
liberty law of 1826 required the magistrate's approval for Prigg to leave
Pennsylvania with Morgan." Prigg and his associates nevertheless took
Morgan and her children back to Maryland, in clear violation of the
state law."
Pennsylvania initially sought extradition of Prigg and his
associates, but Maryland refused. Eventually, the states agreed to an
expedited trial and appeal to the Supreme Court for the specific
purpose of clarifying the constitutionality of the personal liberty law.59
The Pennsylvania trial court found Prigg guilty of violating the
personal liberty law, a decision that was summarily affirmed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court." The United States Supreme Court
reversed this holding.
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Joseph Story, held that
the personal liberty law (and Pennsylvania's conviction of Prigg under
it) was unconstitutional because it was preempted by the
1793 Fugitive Slave Act. After determining that the federal Act itself
was constitutional," the Court determined that the federal government,
rather than state governments, had the duty to enforce the Fugitive
Slave Clause, because the clause appeared only in the national
Constitution.62 Because this authority was vested in the federal
government, the Court held that federal supremacy meant that the 1793
Fugitive Slave Act preempted state laws that interfered with federal law
by "prescrib[ing] additional regulations, and what [the states] may deem
auxiliary provisions for the same purpose.",5 This determination was
reinforced by the Court's finding that the power to legislate on the
return of fugitive slaves was one of exclusive, rather than concurrent,
authority in the federal government. M The Court thus held that
Pennsylvania's personal liberty law, and others like it, were
56 Finkelman, 1994 S Ct Rev at 276 (cited in note 42).
57 Prigg, 41 US (16 Pet) at 608-09.
58 See id at 609.
59 See id (emphasizing the cooperation of Maryland and Pennsylvania in seeking Supreme
Court resolution of this question). See also Finkelman, 25 Civil War Hist at 8 (cited in note 52)
(summarizing the negotiations and agreement between Pennsylvania and Maryland).
60 Prigg,41 US (16 Pet) at 609.
61 Id at 615-16 (determining that the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act was constitutional because
the Fugitive Slave Clause required that the slave owners' rights be protected among the states
and "where the end is required, the means are given"). Before Prigg, only state courts had
weighed in on the question of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act's constitutionality. See note 42. This
holding definitively put the question to rest.
62 Prigg,41 US (16 Pet) at 615-16.
63 Id at 617-18.
6 Id at 622-25.
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unconstitutional because they interfered with the federal law through
the additional procedural protections they provided."
The Court's determination that the federal government had
exclusive authority over the regulation of fugitive slaves, however,
forced it to define the role that states had in enforcing the
1793 Fugitive Slave Act. In analyzing this role, Justice Story concluded
that "[t]he states cannot [ ] be compelled to enforce [the 1793 Fugitive
Slave Act]; and it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise
of the power of interpretation, to insist that the states are bound to
provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national
government."" But the Court made clear that this holding did not
infringe on states' ability to exercise their general police powers "to
arrest and restrain runaway slaves, and remove them from their borders,
and otherwise to secure themselves against their depredations and evil
example, as they certainly may do in cases of idlers, vagabonds and
paupers."" This meant, according to most scholars, that states had the
choice to assist with the enforcement of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.6
In other words, states were prohibited from passing laws that
frustrated the purposes of federal law with additional procedures.
States could, however, either assist in enforcing federal law or refuse
to aid in enforcement if they so desired.
The Court's holding that states could refuse to assist with
enforcement was not, however, unanimous. Chief Justice Roger Taney
agreed with the opinion of the Court only insofar as it held the
Pennsylvania law unconstitutional, established slave owners' right to
peacefully arrest their fugitive slaves wherever they encountered
them, and recognized the power of Congress to legislate on the matter
of returning fugitive slaves to their owners.69 But he had two
objections. First, Taney construed the opinion of the Court to make
"all laws upon the subject [of fugitive slaves] passed by a state, since
the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, [ ] null and
void."o Most later commentary on Prigg suggests that this concern of
65 Id at 625-26.
66 Prigg, 41 US (16 Pet) at 625. See also Finkelman, 25 Civil War Hist at 15-16 (cited in
note 52) (suggesting that some free-state legislatures interpreted the conclusion that Congress
was solely responsible for the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Clause to mean that states could
not be forced to enforce federal fugitive slave laws).
67 Prigg,41 US (16 Pet) at 625.
68 See, for example, Finkelman, 25 Civil War Hist at 9-10 (cited in note 52). See also Moore
v Illinois, 55 US (14 How) 13,19-21 (1852) (upholding a state law designed to incarcerate people
harboring fugitive slaves despite the fact that the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act prohibited the same
activity).
69 Prigg,41 US (16 Pet) at 626-27 (Taney concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70 Id at 627 (emphasis added) (noting that the opinion would have this effect even on laws
passed in good faith that did not conflict with federal legislation).
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Taney's was based on his misreading of Justice Story's opinion." A
minority of scholars, however, argue that Taney was not mistaken and
that Prigg was intended to remove from the states any authority to
assist with enforcing the federal Act.72 This minority interpretation is
substantially undermined, however, by Justice Story's explicit
acknowledgement that states could continue to exercise their police
powers to assist with the reclamation of fugitive slaves and his later
affirmation of states' ability to enforce the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.
Taney's second concern was that the practical result of allowing
states to refuse to assist in enforcement would be the nullification of
the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act. Taney contended that state cooperation in
enforcement was necessary for the Act to be effective.7 ' That is, in
allowing states to abstain from enforcing the federal law, the Court
allowed the law itself to essentially go unenforced because state and
local cooperation was essential to the law's effectiveness. This latter
concern largely came to fruition.
C. The Fugitive Slave Debate Continued: Divergent Levels of
Enforcement after Prigg v Pennsylvania
The initial response to Prigg fell, predictably, along sectional lines.
Southern states considered the decision to be a broad victory, while
the antislavery movement in Northern states was disappointed with
the apparent strengthening of slave owners' rights." The initial
response, however, soon reversed as Northern states passed laws
forbidding local resources from being used to enforce the
1793 Fugitive Slave Act and Northern courts interpreted Prigg as
removing from state officials the authority to enforce federal law. In
response to Prigg's holding that the Northern personal liberty laws
adding procedural protections were unconstitutional, many Northern
states passed new personal liberty laws designed to take advantage of
the Prigg Court's discussion suggesting that Northern states were not
obligated to enforce the federal law. A good example of these later
laws is the one passed by the Massachusetts legislature in 1843. This
Act provided that "[n]o judge of any court of record of
[Massachusetts], and no justice of the peace, shall hereafter take
cognizance or grant a certificate" in Fugitive Slave Act cases, and that
71 See Finkelman,25 Civil War Hist at 20 (cited in note 52).
72 See, for example, R. Kent Newmyer, The Supreme Court under Marshall and Taney 125
(Harlan Davidson 2d ed 2006) (asserting that Story concluded that states were "not
constitutionally able [] to assist in the return of slaves").
73 Prigg,41 US (16 Pet) at 630-31 (Taney concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74 See Maltz, Slavery and the Supreme Court at 136 (cited in note 43) (quoting several
abolitionist newspapers expressing displeasure with Prigg).
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"[n]o sheriff, deputy-sheriff... or other officer of [Massachusetts],
shall hereafter arrest or detain, or aid in the arrest or detention or
imprisonment in any jail ... of any person for the reason that he is
claimed as a fugitive slave."" This law, as well as others like it,
explicitly barred state officials from providing any assistance to slave
owners in reclaiming their slaves, such as the use of the public jail to
keep the slave overnight on return to the owner's state." Without the
assistance of the local authorities, the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act became
practically unenforceable in these states until it was amended by
Congress.
Besides these later personal liberty laws, Northern courts
interpreted Prigg in ways that frustrated owners' efforts to reclaim
their slaves with the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act. Prigg removed most of
the uncertainty surrounding the constitutional authority of Congress
to pass laws implementing the Fugitive Slave Clause." Several judges,
however, interpreted the language in Prigg- specifically the language
questioning Congress's authority to compel state judges to enforce the
1793 Fugitive Slave Act-to mean that state authorities lacked any
jurisdiction over fugitive slaves. In In re Kirk," for example, a New
York trial court had to determine the constitutionality of a New York
law that enabled ship captains to arrest and return stowaway slaves if
the captain brought the slaves before the city mayor to authorize the
arrest." Applying Prigg, the court determined that the New York law
authorizing this procedure was unconstitutional because "the law of
Congress may be truly said to cover the whole ground of the
Constitution" and that the legislation of Congress "must supersede all
75 An Act Further to Protect Personal Liberty §§ 1-2, 1843 Mass Acts ch 69 at 33
(providing a fine and imprisonment for judges and law enforcement officials that help slave
owners recover runaway slaves).
76 For examples of laws from other states with similar provisions, see Act of June 6, 1844,
1844 Conn Pub Acts ch 27 at 33; Act of March 3, 1847, 1847 Pa Laws ch 159 at 206. See also
Maltz, Slavery and the Supreme Court at 137 (cited in note 43) (describing the circumstances that
led to Connecticut, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont passing new
personal liberty laws forbidding the use of local resources in efforts to reclaim slaves).
77 See Finkelman, 25 Civil War Hist at 21-22 (cited in note 52); Act of Sept 18, 1850
("1850 Fugitive Slave Act"), 9 Stat 462 (1850) (creating a comprehensive statutory scheme that
placed federal officials in counties of Northern states with the task of assisting the capture and
return of fugitive slaves).
78 See Ex Parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St 77, 186-87 (1859) (citing and discussing a few state
supreme court cases that predominantly recognized Congress's power to enact legislation like
the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act). But see In re Booth, 3 Wis 13,64-71 (1854) (holding that Congress
did not have authority to pass a later Fugitive Slave Act on grounds that the original intent of
the Fugitive Slave Clause was not to bestow such authority), revd, Ableman v Booth, 62 US 506,
523-26 (1858).
7 1 Edm Sel Cas 315 (NY Sup Ct 1846).
s0 Id at 333-34.
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state legislation upon the same subject, and, by necessary implication,
prohibit it."" This court, and others using similar reasoning, thus
broadly interpreted Prigg to mean that all state laws on the issue of
slavery were invalidated.
Of course, not every court completely rejected the authority of
states and state courts to assist with the enactment of the Fugitive
Slave Clause." Nevertheless, the combined effect of some courts
removing jurisdiction from local authorities and state statutes
prohibiting the same authorities from assisting enforcement of the
1793 Fugitive Slave Act was to make the Act unenforceable in many
Northern states. These areas contrasted starkly with Southern states,
which did everything they could to make it possible to capture
runaway slaves. Many Southern states, for example, denied alleged
slaves the right to habeas corpus-a right that Northern states thought
they deserved"-and enacted laws that encouraged the detention and
return of runaway slaves." Southern states also had considerable
influence over federal fugitive slave policy, as is evident in the passage
of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act," which placed a federal agent with
significant monetary incentives for capturing and returning fugitive
slaves in every county." Unsurprisingly, the state and federal statutes
show that Southern states sought to maximize enforcement of the
fugitive slave acts, creating areas of overenforcement in the South.
The debate following Prigg, therefore, was defined by drastically
differing levels of enforcement. Northern states took steps to avoid
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Acts, while Southern states took
what steps they could to enforce the acts. When this divergence was
not solely the result of differing statutory language (as in today's
debate over immigration), it was the result of state court
interpretations of Prigg. Differences over the federal Fugitive Slave
81 Id at 336-37 (emphasis added).
82 See Finkelman, 25 Civil War Hist at 22-25 (cited in note 52) (discussing several cases
from Northern states that utilized Prigg to absolve themselves of responsibility to enforce the
1793 Fugitive Slave Act).
83 See, for example, Moore, 55 US (14 How) at 18-21 (upholding an Illinois law making it
illegal to aid fugitive slaves in their flight as a proper exercise of the state's police power).
8 Morris, Free Men All at 38-39 (cited in note 40) (discussing Southern representatives'
refusal to accept habeas corpus as a mechanism to review whether an alleged slave is actually
slave or free).
8 See Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-bellum South 153
(3d ed Knopf 1956) (noting the lawful ability of all white men to seize fugitive slaves).
86 Act of Sept 18, 1850 ("1850 Fugitive Slave Act"), ch 60,9 Stat 462 (1850).
87 See 1850 Fugitive Slave Act §§ 1-2,5,8, 9 Stat at 462-65. See also Jeffrey Schmitt, Note,
Rethinking Ableman v. Booth and States' Rights in Wisconsin, 93 Va L Rev 1315, 1319-20 (2007)
(describing the procedures of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act as a response to Southern demands
that were dramatically successful in helping Southern slave owners).
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Acts thus became embodied through differing levels of enforcement
at the state and local level.
III. PARALLELS BETWEEN THE IMMIGRATION AND
FUGITIVE SLAVE DEBATES
The central argument of this Comment is that the antebellum
fugitive slave debate and the current immigration debate have several
intriguing similarities that allow lessons learned from the former to
inform the latter. This Part lays out the two strongest similarities: First,
both debates have been channeled through states varying their level
of enforcement of a federal law, rather than just through discourse in
the public sphere or changes in federal law. Second, both debates
center on how states interact with the federal government with regard
to individuals illegally within their borders whose illegal (fugitive)
status is determined by an area of law within the federal government's
exclusive authority. Each of these similarities will be discussed below.
A. Debates Continued through Varied Levels of Local Enforcement
One of the strongest similarities between these debates about
laws exclusively the federal government's to establish is that each is a
national debate that is channeled into the states as questions about
states' role in enforcing federal law, and furthered by proponents on
either side of the discussion through varied levels of local
enforcement of federal law rather than direct change of the national
policies. That is, instead of the debates taking place and being
addressed in Congress, state and local legislative chambers are the
primary actors in influencing the national policies at issue as they pass
laws intended to resolve the federal issue in a manner favorable to
their local interests. This is most obvious when comparing the
underenforcement pursued by Northern states in the fugitive slave
debate with sanctuary jurisdictions in the immigration debate.
Northern states post-Prigg demonstrated their disagreement with the
Southern institution of slavery and the federal government's support
of it by abdicating as much responsibility for assisting in the
enforcement of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act as possible." This mirrors
the modern sanctuary jurisdictions, which have expressed discontent
with federal immigration laws by refusing to provide assistance to the
federal immigration authorities."
88 See notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
89 See notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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The similarity continues on the opposite end of the enforcement
spectrum as well. Throughout the fugitive slave debate, Southern
states sought to maximize the return of fugitive slaves within their
borders through state and federal laws. Likewise, proponents of strict
enforcement today have also used their influence in state and federal
legislatures to ratchet up the level of enforcement of federal
immigration law." In both debates, therefore, jurisdictions that
considered the current federal laws to be too lenient-at least in
application-expressed their discontent by passing laws and bringing
cases that created areas of overenforcement.
The fugitive slave and immigration debates, therefore, share a
common locus of debate. States and localities that desire laws more
favorable to illegally present persons enact laws that diminish the
effectiveness of the federal law by reducing enforcement. Those that
favor more stringent immigration policies, however, enact state laws
that seek to maximize the enforcement of existing laws. The states'
creation of areas of under- and overenforcement has thus been used in
both debates to further the cause and express the discontent of
partisans on each side of the debate. When this similarity is viewed in
light of the similar legal questions discussed below, the fugitive slave
debate's relevance in understanding today's immigration debate
becomes particularly evident.
B. Slaves and Illegal Immigrants: Similar Legal Questions Arising
through Similar Legal Circumstances
Besides the shared locus of debate, the fugitive slave and
immigration disputes also share a unique legal subject matter: they
center on what actions states can take towards individuals within their
borders whose presence there is made illegal by federal law. In Prigg
and the fugitive slave debate, these individuals were runaway slaves,
while in the Arizona immigration case and the broader immigration
debate, these individuals are illegal immigrants. These groups share
one-and likely only one-characteristic: their status as illegally
present in a state is established by federal law. There are few other
groups whose legal status is similarly determined, and none that have
stirred national debates embodied through varied levels of state and
local enforcement.
The most important aspect of this similarity is that it substantially
increases the value provided by, and possibly creates the necessity for,
local enforcement. As discussed earlier, the statuses of both fugitive
9 See notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
91 See notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
1482 [78:1465
State Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law
slaves and illegal immigrants as illegally present in a state are
determined by federal law. Detecting illegal presence, however, is
incredibly difficult for the federal government given its generally
limited resources for enforcing the underlying laws. This is evident in
both debates through federal laws that authorize and even encourage
state assistance with enforcement of the federal law." The reliance on
states for enforcement is fraught with difficulties, however, as it
provides states an opportunity to express their policy preferences by
varying their levels of enforcement." This creates at least two legal
questions: First, must states assist the federal government if they
prefer not to? And second, to what extent can a state enforce the law
with or without federal consent? Both debates have directly
addressed, though not necessarily resolved, both of these questions.
The fugitive slave debate addresses the question whether states
are obligated to assist with federal enforcement in the courts, while
the immigration debate has mostly discussed this through various
forms of legislation. Prigg resolved the question in favor of
underenforcing states by establishing, perhaps inadvertently, that
states had no duty to enforce laws that were exclusively federal.9 The
immigration debate has not yet come to a conclusion, but many state
and local governments continue to have sanctuary policies" despite
several state and federal laws mandating state and local law officials'
aid in enforcing the immigration regime.9 The conflicting laws show
that there is an ongoing debate over the ability of the federal
government to mandate assistance." States' duties to assist in
enforcement of federal laws involving individuals within state
boundaries are thus at issue in both debates.
Both debates also contemplate the extent to which states can
voluntarily assist the federal government in enforcing the same
92 See 1793 Fugitive Slave Act § 1, 1 Stat at 302 (authorizing "any magistrate of a county,
city or town corporate" to hear and enable the removal of fugitive slaves); Immigration and
Nationality Act § 287(g), Pub L No 414,66 Stat 163,233-34 (1952), as amended by IIRIRA § 133,
8 USC § 1357(g) (authorizing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to authorize state
and local law enforcement to assist with detection and arrest of illegal immigrants).
93 See Part III.A.
94 See Prigg, 41 US (16 Pet) at 625.
95 See, for example, Newsom, Executive Directive 07-01 (cited in note 21).
96 See, for example, IIRIRA § 642, 8 USC § 1373; SB 1070 § 2, codified at Ariz Rev Stat
Ann § 11-1051 (providing residents of Arizona a cause of action against Arizona law enforcement
agencies that do not carry out the state's policy of enforcing federal immigration law).
97 See, for example, Buck Delventhal, Mariam Morley, and Wayne Snodgrass, Legal
Memorandum to San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom, Legal Issues in Connection with
Proposed Amendment to Sanctuary City Ordinance *5-6 (Aug 18, 2009), online at
http://www.sfcityattorney.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid= 4 81 (visited Sept 1,
2011) (concluding that available case law is not sufficient to predict how federal courts would
rule if the city's sanctuary policies were challenged on preemption grounds).
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federal laws. This is most evident for the fugitive slave debate in Prigg,
where one of the central issues of dispute between Justice Story and
Chief Justice Taney was the extent to which states could continue to
assist with enforcement of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act. Story, writing
for the Court, stated that states were permitted to enforce the Act
within the scope of their police powers.. Taney, however, argued that
states' police powers were not sufficient to permit them to enforce the
Act because "[t]he fugitive is not always arrested in order to prevent a
dangerous or evil-disposed person from remaining in [a state's]
territory."" That is, he understood states' police powers not to be
broad enough to allow states to assist owners to reclaim fugitive slaves
who had not actually caused a disruption of the peace."oo The justices
thus disagreed over the placement of the line between a proper
assertion of states' police powers and preemption.
Though the line has never been definitively drawn, in Moore v
Illinois,"' the antebellum Court made clear that states could pass laws
to enforce the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act by upholding a state law that
outlawed the sheltering of fugitive slaves as done in the federal Act.10
At the least, the exchange demonstrates that an aspect of the fugitive
slave debate was whether states could utilize their police powers to
enforce the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.
This same legal question is a central part of the current
immigration debate. Arizona's stated purpose in passing SB 1070, for
example, is to "cooperatively enforce" the federal law consistent with
its own police powers rather than add additional regulations or
procedures to immigration law."' As discussed above, the effect of this
98 Prigg, 41 US (16 Pet) at 625.
99 Id at 632 (Taney concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100 Id at 633.
101 55 US (14 How) 13 (1852).
102 Id at 19-21 (upholding a state law designed to incarcerate people harboring fugitive
slaves, despite the fact that the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act prohibited the same activity).
103 See SB 1070 § 1 (expressing Arizona legislature's finding that it is within its interest to
pursue "cooperative enforcement" of federal immigration law to discourage illegal immigrants from
moving to and doing business in the state through a policy of "attrition through enforcement").
Whether Arizona will succeed in doing this is, of course, debatable. Some provisions of SB 1070
clearly do provide additional regulations on smuggling and employment of illegal immigrants. See
SB 1070 §§ 4-9. These provisions, however, are not the focus of this Comment because they are not
intended to enforce federal law in the unique way discussed here-namely, enforcement of federal
law through the arrest, detention, and prosecution of violators under state law. See SB 1070 H§ 2-3,
codified at Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§ 11-1051, 13-1509; notes 111-18 and accompanying text. Of course,
whether these sections succeed in merely enforcing federal law, rather than creating a new state
remedy, is also debatable. This Comment assumes for the sake of argument, however, that SB 1070
creates a policy of "cooperative enforcement." Separate analysis of these provisions is possible
because of the severability clause that allows each provision of the statute to stand if another is
found unconstitutional. SB 1070 § 12.
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law is to make Arizona an area in which the federal immigration laws
are overenforced.'" Opponents, however, have been quick to challenge
Arizona's overenforcement ability In Arizona, the United States
argues that SB 1070 is preempted by federal immigration law because
immigration is an area of exclusive federal power over which
Congress has asserted its plenary authority."'o The government
contends that this exclusive authority means that the enforcement
regime established in SB 1070 is an unconstitutional infringement on
Congress's authority to regulate immigration, because it interferes
with the federal government's ability to create a uniform immigration
policy, of which the level of enforcement is an integral part.' The
immigration debate, therefore, also involves a question about the
extent of states' ability to enforce federal law.
As demonstrated above, however, the common legal questions in
the slavery and immigration contexts are the result of the unique
situation in which fugitive slaves and illegal immigrants find
themselves: carrying a status determined by federal laws. But there are
also important differences between slaves and immigrants, the most
important being that slaves were considered property," while illegal
immigrants are simply in violation of immigration laws, retain certain
rights,'8o and are obviously not property.'" This difference indicates that
state assistance might be more expected in the fugitive slave context,
because states enforcing fugitive slave laws could characterize their
behavior as helping protect the property rights of individual citizens,
instead of merely acting as agents of the federal government. Such
enforcement of individual property rights is an area in which states
have traditionally acted.'
This does qualify the lessons drawn from the fugitive slave debate
to some extent, but it does not make them irrelevant for two reasons.
104 See notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
105 US Appellate Brief at *27-29 (claiming the federal government's responsibility to
"establish and implement a uniform foreign policy" as grounds for the federal government's
exclusive control over immigration policy).
106 See id at *29-31 (describing Arizona's conception of separate enforcement as within
states' ability as a "fundamental[] misunderstand[ing]" of the "scope and nature of the States'
role" in situations where Congress has exclusive authority to regulate).
107 See Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393,451-52 (1856) ("[T]he right of property
in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution.").
108 See, for example, Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678, 693-94 (2001) (determining that Due
Process Clause protections are extended to aliens present legally or illegally once they have
entered the country).
109 See US Const Amend XIII, cl 1.
110 See Pennoyer v Neff, 95 US 714,722 (1877) ("[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has
the power to ... regulate the manner and conditions upon which property situated within such
territory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and transferred.").
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First, the distinction does not eliminate the common legal question.
Despite the state law questions of property at issue in the slavery
debate, it was only federal law-namely, the fugitive slave acts-that
provided the method of recovery for slaves by slave owners and that
led to inevitable questions about states' obligation to carry out federal
law when slave owners utilized the Act in a Northern state."' Thus,
only federal law-not concepts such as comity, full faith and credit, or
recognition of sister-state law-governed these disputes. Second, the
diminished power of states relative to the federal government
following the Civil War cuts in the opposite direction. Modern
conceptions of federalism-tempered by the experience of the Civil
War and the Reconstruction Amendments-have weakened
conceptions of states' rights. Thus, just as we might once have expected
an antebellum state to be required to assist with the recovery of a
fugitive slave (because individual property rights were at stake), we
might now expect a modern state to be required to assist with
enforcing federal law (given the modern relationship between the
federal government and the states). Therefore, while the property
distinction between the fugitive slave debate and today's immigration
debate is an important distinction, it does not fundamentally alter the
question about states' roles in enforcing federal laws.
The immigration and fugitive slave debates, therefore, share not
only a common locus of debate but also common legal questions
about the appropriate role that states have in enforcing federal laws
that the federal government itself has difficulty enforcing. These
similarities make it possible to use the fugitive slave debate and the
legal reasoning used in Prigg to inform the current immigration debate.
IV. LESSONS FROM THE FUGITIVE SLAVE DEBATE FOR THE
CURRENT IMMIGRATION DEBATE
The antebellum debate sheds light on at least two aspects of the
current immigration debate: the constitutionality of laws like SB 1070
in jurisdictions of overenforcement and the implications that differing
levels of state enforcement have for the Supreme Court's ability to
resolve the debate. The following analysis will first show that though
the fugitive slave debate provides precedent for a crucial distinction
necessary to find SB 1070 constitutional, the antebellum debate shows
that the consequences of recognizing this distinction can be disastrous
for the vitality of federal law-a fact that suggests that the distinction
should not be carried forward and that SB 1070 should be held
1l See Part H.A.
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unconstitutional. This Part will then analyze the channeling
characteristic of these debates that forces them into a common locus
(the role of states in enforcing federal law) in order to better
understand when this occurs and what effect it has on a debate's
scope. This understanding will then be used to show that the Court
should utilize a narrowly tailored resolution when deciding legal
questions that arise from debates of this nature.
A. Insights from the Complementary Legal Questions
The fugitive slave and immigration debates address complementary
questions. Whereas the antebellum debate was about states' ability to
disrupt federal law through underenforcement, the debate surrounding
SB 1070 is about states' ability to disrupt federal law through
overenforcement. Understanding the debates in this way allows for
several insights into the immigration debate. The following discussion
will first explain how Prigg and the fugitive slave debate show the
vitality of a distinction urged by Arizona: that state enforcement of
federal law through arrest, detainment, and prosecution under federal
law is different from enforcement through separate state remedies that
supplement federal law. The analysis will then demonstrate that modem
preemption jurisprudence lacks direct precedent on the constitutionality
of this form of enforcement. Finally, the discussion will consider the
resolution to the dispute in Arizona suggested by Justice Story's and
Chief Justice Taney's competing understandings of the holding in Prigg.
Taney's view clearly suggests that Arizona's law is unconstitutional.
Story's view also shows that SB 1070 is unconstitutional, albeit in a
different manner: it demonstrates that, although the distinction urged
by Arizona has some merit, allowing states to vary their levels of
enforcement has profound consequences for the effectiveness of federal
law -consequences that warrant preemption.
1. Prigg's insights on the enforcement distinction
urged in Arizona.
Arizona focuses on states' abilities to overenforce federal law.
This litigation is not the only ongoing immigration litigation,"2 but it
asks a unique preemption question. The controversy in Arizona is, in
part, about whether state and local government can enact laws that do
not alter the immigration scheme with additional remedies but
"merely seek[] to assist with the enforcement of existing federal
112 See, for example, Lozano v City of Hazleton, 620 F3d 170,224 (3d Cir 2010), petition for
cert filed, 79 USLW 3370 (Dec 8, 2010) (holding that two city ordinances regulating illegal
immigrant employment and housing leases were preempted by federal law).
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immigration laws."'" This concept of enforcement is unique because it
means that SB 1070 "merely" assists with the enforcement of federal
law by arresting, detaining, and prosecuting violators of existing federal
law with state resources, even though it lacks federal authorization."4
This question is far different from the more typical preemption
questions that are before courts, which generally arise from a state
creating a separate or additional remedy that assists or interferes with
federal laws; in the immigration context, such a law might take the
form of a state statute that requires aliens to register with the state in
addition to any federal registration requirements. This form of state
action is assuredly preempted,"' but whether a state can assist or
interfere in the former arrest, detention, and prosecution manner is
uncertain.
The question that immediately arises, however, is whether the
distinction between enforcement and remedies is a meaningful one, or
whether overenforcement through arrest, detention, and prosecution
is simply another form of state remedy (and thus preempted). The
fugitive slave debate and Prigg indicate that the distinction does,
indeed, have merit. This is most apparent in how the Northern personal
liberty laws shifted after Prigg."' Before Prigg, these laws took the
form of separate state remedies that increased the procedural
protections for alleged fugitive slaves. For example, Pennsylvania's
personal liberty law required several additional steps to receive state
authority to remove a slave from Pennsylvania in addition to receiving
federal authority under the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act."'
After Prigg held these statutes unconstitutional,"' Northern states
took advantage of the Court's language suggesting states had no
responsibility to enforce the federal law by passing new personal
liberty laws that, rather than create separate remedies, frustrated
enforcement through the prohibition of assistance by state authorities
with the arrest, detainment, and prosecution of fugitive slaves as
contemplated in the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act."9 Pennsylvania's post-
113 Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, United States v
Arizona, No CV10-1413, *3 (D Ariz filed July 22,2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 3154413).
114 See SB 1070 H§ 2,6, codified at Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§ 11-1051,13-3883.
115 See notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
116 The distinction is also discussed briefly in Prigg itself. See Prigg, 41 US (16 Pet) at 625
(clarifying that the holdings of Prigg did not infringe on states' ability to exercise their police
powers because the Court "entertain[ed] no doubt whatsoever, that the states, in virtue of their
general police power, possess full jurisdiction to arrest and restrain runaway slaves, and remove
them from their borders") (emphasis added).
117 See notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
118 Prigg, 41 US (16 Pet) at 617-18.
119 See Part II.C.
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Prigg personal liberty law, for example, modified the prior act to make
it unlawful "to use any jail or prison of [Pennsylvania], for the
detention of any person claimed as a fugitive from servitude or labor
... .120 The shift from underenforcement through separate state
remedies to underenforcement through arrest, detention, and
prosecution shows that Northern states considered these methods of
assistance (or interference) to be distinct from one another-with the
latter being a constitutional exercise of state police powers and the
former an unconstitutional infringement on the federal government's
authority. Prigg and the fugitive slave debate show, therefore, that the
"cooperative enforcement" of the Arizona law is a distinct preemption
question from the preemption question associated with separate state
remedies.
2. Value of lessons from the antebellum debate in light of
modern preemption doctrine.
The insights provided by Prigg and the fugitive slave debate are
valuable not only in clarifying the particular question at issue in the
Arizona litigation but also in resolving it. This is so because modern
preemption doctrine does not directly resolve the unique question in
Arizona: whether overenforcement through statutes that do not create
state remedies but seek to increase enforcement of federal law
through elevated state assistance is preempted by federal law.
Preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause, which
establishes the federal Constitution and laws as superior to those of
the states."' Preemption comes in one of two forms: express or
implied.'22 At issue in Arizona is implied preemption, which can be
further divided into two subtypes that have been recognized by the
Court: field preemption and conflict preemption.2 Both allow for the
preemption of laws that do not explicitly conflict with the text of a
federal statute.12 Field preemption allows for state laws to be
preempted if Congress enacts laws that entirely occupy a field of law,
either explicitly or implicitly.12 Conflict preemption, on the other hand,
occurs when compliance with both federal and state law is impossible
120 An Act to Prevent Kidnapping §§ 6,8,1847 Pa Laws ch 159 at 208.
121 See US Const Art VI, cl 2.
122 Gade, 505 US at 98.
123 Id.
124 See id.
125 Id. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 402 (Aspen
3d ed 2006) ("[T]he Court will find field preemption either if Congress expresses a clear intent
that federal law will be exclusive in an area or if comprehensive federal regulation evidences a
congressional desire that federal law should completely occupy the field.").
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or when the state law interferes with the purposes and objectives of
Congress in passing the federal law at issue.12 6 Each doctrine can
provide insights into the enforcement question in Arizona, but the
case law in neither is sufficient to definitively resolve it.
Field preemption cannot resolve the question in Arizona, because
the Court has not considered the particular form of enforcement at
issue in the case. Consider Hines v Davidowitz,'" the leading field
preemption case in the immigration context.'" In Hines, the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania law requiring
aliens to register with the state in addition to any obligations the
aliens had under federal immigration law.129 The Court determined
that the state law essentially created a separate state remedy, and was
therefore preempted by federal immigration laws.'" The federal
government, the Court held, had completely occupied the field of law
governing alien registration by passing its own alien registration act
that left no room for additional state regulation."' This decision is
representative of other field preemption cases, which typically involve
state laws that provide separate and slightly different remedies
designed to complement or frustrate federal authority. This means
that field preemption does not directly deal with the unique question
in Arizona. Field preemption, therefore, does not definitively show
that enforcement as contemplated in SB 1070 is preempted.
Conflict preemption is likewise indeterminate because SB 1070 is
neither impossible to enforce along with federal law nor in obvious
conflict with the congressionally intended operation of the
immigration scheme. Enforcement of laws like SB 1070 along with
126 Gade, 505 US at 98.
127 312 US 52 (1941).
128 See Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law at 402 (cited in note 125) (calling Hines the
"classic example of preemption of state regulation in the field of immigration").
129 Hines, 312 US at 59-62.
130 Id at 73-74 (interpreting Congress's intent to create "a single integrated and all-
embracing system ... free from the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance").
131 Id at 67-74 (finding that the Pennsylvania statute interfered with Congress's valid goal
of uniformity in immigration policy).
132 See, for example, American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396, 408-13
(2003) (determining a California law designed to reveal abusive practices by insurance providers
during the Holocaust was preempted by executive agreements with several countries seeking to
do the same); Crosby v National Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000); Toll v Moreno,458 US 1,3-17
(1982); DeCanas v Bica, 424 US 351 (1976); Pennsylvania v Nelson, 350 US 497 (1956); Takahashi
v Fish and Game Commission, 334 US 410 (1948). The important aspect of these cases is that
each centers on a particular state law or policy that has an impact on aliens that would not
necessarily happen under the direct application of federal law, but none deal with laws that only
dedicate state resources to enforce federal laws and provide no additional state remedy,
punishment, or regulation on aliens. In other words, these cases deal with state laws creating
separate remedies but not policies of cooperative enforcement as arguably done in SB 1070.
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federal laws is possible because the state laws are designed to
maximize compliance with federal law and no federal law forbids the
type of assistance contemplated in SB 1070."' And SB 1070 does not
necessarily conflict with the purpose and objective of Congress.
Congressional intent on the matter of assistance with immigration
enforcement is far from clear; some provisions suggest that state
assistance is desirable, 4 while others suggest that assistance is only
wanted through particular means."' The enforcement question
resulting from SB 1070 thus cannot be definitively found to be in
tension with the purpose and objective of Congress because there are
no clear guiding principles regarding what the congressional objective
is for state assistance with enforcement. Conflict preemption,
therefore, also fails to definitively resolve the preemption question in
Arizona.
The lessons provided in Prigg and the fugitive slave debate are
particularly valuable, therefore, because preemption jurisprudence is
unable to resolve the overenforcement question created by SB 1070.
The case law either focuses on overenforcement through separate
state remedies, which is not even contested by the parties in Arizona,"
or is not definitive because of an absence of congressional direction.
In essence, modern preemption case law does not address the specific
enforcement question asked by jurisdictions of overenforcement like
Arizona: To what extent can a state overenforce a federal law by using
state resources to arrest, detain, and prosecute people in violation of
the federal law? This is exactly the question the antebellum debate
addresses.
The fugitive slave debate and Prigg centered on the question of
states' ability to enforce federal law by arresting, detaining, and
prosecuting those who have violated it (rather than providing separate
remedies). Justice Story, writing for the Court in Prigg, for instance,
explicitly affirmed the ability of states to assist with enforcement,
stating that the Court "entertain[ed] no doubt whatsoever, that the
states, in virtue of their general police power, possess full jurisdiction
to arrest and restrain runaway slaves, and remove them from their
133 See notes 29-32 and accompanying text. See also note 103.
134 See IIRIRA § 642, 8 USC § 1373 (prohibiting state and local governments from
withholding immigration information from federal authorities).
135 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g),66 Stat at 233-34, as amended by IIRIRA
§ 133, 8 USC § 1357(g) (creating a program that allows DHS to sign agreements with state and
local law enforcement that allow for greater coordination and enforcement by the local
authorities).
136 See US Appellate Brief at *29 (acknowledging that "Arizona does not claim authority to
regulate in the sphere of immigration" but instead claims that it can "enforce immigration law
independently of the immigration priorities of the federal government").
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borders .... "' This language was used by courts to show that while
Prigg limited states' ability to frustrate efforts to reclaim slaves
through separate remedies, states still had latitude in deciding whether
to "arrest, restrain, and even remove from [their] borders" fugitive
slaves."' Furthermore, though states had the ability to arrest and
restrain runaway slaves, following Prigg, Northern states disrupted the
effectiveness of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act primarily by decreasing
the degree to which they assisted with arresting and detaining these
slaves.' The authority for states to alter the degree of assistance with
enforcement of federal law through arrest and detainment of persons
illegally within their borders, as determined by federal law, was thus
directly discussed and recognized in the fugitive slave debate.
Admittedly, the informative usefulness of Prigg and the
antebellum debate is limited because they focus on these questions
mostly as a matter of underenforcement. This does not make the
fugitive slave debate uninformative, however, because (as
demonstrated above) it asks a complementary question to the one at
issue in Arizona. Namely, where the fugitive slave debate was
fundamentally about states' ability to disrupt federal laws by
frustrating enforcement, the current overenforcement debate in
Arizona is about the ability of states to disrupt federal prerogatives by
enhancing enforcement. This complementary nature is unsurprising,
because both legal contexts involve persons whose legal status within
a debate is dependent on federal law-a situation that forces legal
questions about the appropriate role for states in enforcing that
federal law.14 Understood in this way, the antebellum debate is,
therefore, uniquely situated to provide valuable insights into the
immigration debate that cannot be derived from existing preemption
case law.
3. Insights on Arizona from Prigg and the fugitive slave debate.
Prigg's direct discussion of the question of enforcement as
contemplated in SB 1070 makes the decision particularly fruitful for
resolving the dispute in Arizona. As discussed, Justice Story and Chief
137 Prigg, 41 US (16 Pet) at 625 (emphasis added) (clarifying that the holdings of Prigg did
not infringe on states' ability to exercise their police powers). See also note 68.
138 Moore, 55 US (14 How) at 16-17. See also Commonwealth v Tracy, 46 Mass 536, 546-48
(1843); Eells v Illinois, 5 Ill 498,505-06 (1843).
139 This is evident given the fact that the personal liberty laws that came after Prigg were
largely meant to make removal of slaves more difficult by eliminating logistical support, such as
forbidding the use of local jails from slave owners returning with runaway slaves. See
notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
140 See Part III.B.
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Justice Taney had sharply different understandings of what the Court's
determination of exclusive federal authority over the regulation of the
return of fugitive slaves meant for state assistance with enforcement
of the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.'41 If Taney was correct in his dissent
that the Court's ruling made any state law on a subject of exclusive
federal authority unconstitutional,14 then the question in Arizona is an
easy one: immigration is an area of exclusive federal authority,'14 3
SB 1070 is a law on the subject of immigration, and therefore SB 1070
is unconstitutional.
As discussed, however, Taney's understanding of the Court's
holding is frequently considered to be erroneous.44 Guarding against
the interpretation urged by Taney, Justice Story explicitly reserved
authority for states to enforce the federal law through their police
powers. This provided states the choice to either enforce the federal
law or to stand on the sidelines but did not forbid state enforcement.
This means that Prigg made a sharp distinction between those state
actions designed to enforce federal law through the arrest, detention,
and prosecution of violators and those state actions that create
supplemental state remedies; the former were a constitutional exercise
of state police powers, while the latter were an unconstitutional
infringement on the federal government's authority.
The distinction provides historical precedent for the
constitutionality of SB 1070. First, the viability of this distinction
makes the "cooperative enforcement" of the Arizona law a distinct
preemption question from the preemption question associated with
separate state remedies-one that has already been almost certainly
resolved against their constitutionality in the immigration context.
Furthermore, the antebellum debate not only shows that the
distinction has merit but also provides an example of differential
treatment for the two types of enforcement-frustration of
enforcement through state remedy was found unconstitutional, while
frustration through arrest and detainment was at least tolerated. This
historical precedent supports a similar conclusion in the immigration
context that SB 1070 and statutes like it are constitutional.
141 See notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
142 Prigg, 41 US (16 Pet) at 627 (Taney concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143 Hines, 312 US at 62-63 ("[Tihe supremacy of the national power in the general field of
foreign affairs, including power over immigration ... is made clear by the Constitution.").
144 See notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
145 See Prigg, 41 US (16 Pet) at 625 (emphasizing, however, that states could not use their
powers to interfere with federal regulation). See also notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
146 See notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
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Whether this precedent should be applied today, however, is
another question. One benefit of looking back to earlier debates is
that we learn not only what was done, but also the consequences of
the decisions made. The post-Prigg laws passed by Northern states to
create areas of underenforcement made the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act
effectively unenforceable,"' which is perhaps the most extreme form
of interference possible. This interference is at least equivalent to that
caused by some separate remedies that the Court has struck down as
preempted.14 Indeed, such consequences constitute a strong argument
for finding such state enforcement regimes as conflict preempted, in
that they have the potential to allow state enforcement to entirely
frustrate congressional objectives in passing a law. After all, no matter
what Congress's actual desire for states' role in enforcement is, one
can be sure that Congress intends immigration laws to be generally
effective.
The fugitive slave debate, therefore, shows us that modifying
enforcement of federal law through additional or restricted state
assistance with arrest, detainment, and prosecution, as SB 1070 does, is
very likely unconstitutional. On the one hand, Taney's minority view
of the Court's decision in Prigg directly prohibits states from
interfering at all with federal enforcement. On the other hand, Story's
majority view recognizes the enforcement distinction made by
Arizona, but also shows that this type of enforcement is probably at
least as problematic for federal authority as differing levels of
enforcement through additional or varied state remedies and may
even conflict with Congress's desire for an effective immigration
system. That is, the consequences from Prigg demonstrate, as a sort of
real world experiment, the potentially severe disruptive ability that
state enforcement of federal law has for the ability of the federal
government to carry out its goals. Though there may be reasons to
think that interference from overenforcement is less disruptive than
the underenforcement seen after Prigg, at the very least, the
antebellum debate shows a great deal of potential for harm to the
147 See Finkelman, 1994 S Ct Rev at 288 (cited in note 42) ("[T]he decision, in the end, did
lead to a practical nullification of the federal law.").
148 Consider, for example, Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000), in
which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a state law prohibiting businesses from dealing
commercially with a country in which a federal executive order already prohibited further
investment. Id at 366-70, 372-73. The decision held that the state law interfered with the
President's discretion in foreign policy matters by limiting his ability to withdraw the executive
order. Id. State interference with the federal sanctions law at issue in Crosby-which hinders
only a President's discretion by foreclosing an option not yet sought-certainly seems to be less
disruptive than interference from a state law that effectively renders a federal law unenforceable,
as the post-Prigg personal liberty laws did to the 1793 Fugitive Slave Law.
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federal immigration scheme through bills like SB 1070. This potential
ought to create a reasonable hesitance on the part of the Court to
allow independent state enforcement of federal law without more
explicit direction from Congress as to what role it sees states having in
enforcement. Absent this guidance, Prigg and the fugitive slave
debate, considered as a whole, provide powerful historical evidence
for the federal government's argument that the enforcement
contemplated in SB 1070 would fundamentally disrupt the delicate
balance of domestic and international factors considered to determine
the appropriate level of immigration enforcement. This requires
SB 1070 to be found preempted as an unconstitutional infringement
on the federal government's exclusive authority over international
relations.
B. Insights on the Nature of Enforcement Questions and the Role of
the Supreme Court in Resolving Them
There are also lessons to be drawn from the similarities between
the fugitive slave and immigration debates beyond those that suggest
a particular legal outcome. As discussed in Part III, the fugitive slave
and immigration debates are national debates that have been
"channeled" into the states rather than the floors of the Senate and
House of Representatives. In this context, channeling refers to the
effect our Constitution's structure has of pushing both of these
national debates about the appropriate policy for an exclusive federal
responsibility into the states as questions about the states' roles in
enforcing federal law."' Paradoxically, state actions, rather than federal
ones, become the main focus of a federal debate.
This similarity not only allows for the doctrinal lessons drawn out
above but also demonstrates the effect our constitutional design has
on national debates. Channeling a national debate into the states is a
unique feature of our Constitution that can have a profound impact
on the manner and focus of discourse over a national policy."o The
fugitive slave and immigration debates, by sharing this characteristic,
provide us an opportunity to better understand when national debates
are channeled into the states, what impact this has on a debate, and
what implications this aspect of the immigration debate has for the
Supreme Court.
149 See Part II.A.
15o See Bestor, 69 Am Hist Rev at 338-40 (cited in note 7).
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1. Three common characteristics of national debates channeled
into the states.
The fugitive slave and immigration enforcement debates, and
their corresponding broader controversies on slavery and immigration,
respectively, share at least three characteristics that appear to be
necessary preconditions for a national debate to be channeled into the
states: (1) strong and differentiated policy preferences on the national
level, (2) sufficiently concentrated preferences in states to create a
diversity of preferences among individual states, and (3) a mechanism
for states to directly affect the national policy.
As a threshold matter, both debates demonstrate that strong and
differentiated policy preferences are important precursors to such
channeling. Such policy differences are necessary because they make
compromise impossible, thus bringing the national government to a
standstill on the very federal issues it regularly addresses."' This
feature is evident in both debates. The antebellum slavery debate's
failure to reach compromise was made evident in the Civil War, and
the immigration debate has not seen another sincere effort to
comprehensively reform immigration since the last attempt several
years ago.152 Strong and differentiated policy preferences are thus
necessary for channeling, because otherwise the dispute will be
resolved on the national level before it can escalate to the level at
which states will take independent action.
In addition to staunchly divergent preferences, another crucial
element for channeling federal debates into the states is that policy
preferences be concentrated in different states, such that the states
themselves can be seen as having polarized preferences. During the
slavery debate, this concentration was seen in the Northern states that
opposed slavery and resisted efforts to return fugitive slaves, while
Southern states supported slavery and sought the return of fugitive
slaves."' In the immigration debate, the divide is not as sectional, but
preferences are certainly concentrated in particular states.'" This
concentration of preferences in different states is essential to
channeling national debates into the states because it empowers the
151 See Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 96-98 (Chicago 3d ed 2006) (using
the antebellum slavery debate to show how severe, symmetrically strong policy preferences that
differ from one another prevent compromise to such an extent that violent conflict frequently
follows). Polarization is of course not the only way gridlock can be achieved, but it is the
situation in which the controversy is likely to prove so important that actors will not be content
with federal inaction.
152 See Part I.A.
153 See Part II.C.
154 See notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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various factions to enact laws through the political system of the
particular state in which they are dominant. In other words, policy
preferences must be polarized between states but uniform within
states in order to create a diversity of policy outcomes from the states.
In addition to divergent and concentrated policy preferences, if a
debate is to be channeled into the question of state enforcement, then
states must have a mechanism to autonomously affect the federal
government's policy choices. In the fugitive slave and immigration
context, this lever is created by the federal government's reliance on
state assistance in enforcing the federal law."' The significant value
provided to the federal government by state assistance means that
states have a vehicle through which to express their discontent with a
federal policy: varying the level of assistance they provide from that
requested by the federal government. If states lacked this mechanism,
the debate would likely not be channeled to the states because there
would be no relevant way for them to express their policy preferences.
The current debate over the federal deficit, for instance, is unlikely to
be channeled into the states, because there is no mechanism for states
to autonomously affect the federal government's budget. States
having a way to directly impact federal policies, therefore, is essential
to channeling a national debate into the states. And when-as the
fugitive slave and immigration debates suggest-this characteristic is
combined with strong, differentiated policy preferences at the national
level and concentrated policy preferences within the states, then the
national debate may be channeled into the states.
2. The effect of channeling federal policy debates into the states.
Knowing when a national debate on federal policy is likely to be
channeled into the states is valuable because channeling has a
profound effect on the substance of the debate itself. The most
important effect is that the scope of debate on the federal policy is
dramatically narrowed when it is channeled to a particular locus. The
pre-Civil War slavery debate did not focus on the morality or
perceived necessity of slavery but instead focused on collateral issues
such as the expansion of slavery into the territories and the return of
fugitive slaves."' In other words, moving the debate to questions about
states' (or territories') duties and abilities regarding slavery meant
that the central issue in contention was never reached. Debating
155 See notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
156 Bestor, 69 Am Hist Rev at 338-39, 343-44 (cited in note 7) (describing the focus of the
antebellum slavery debate on collateral issues as the "central paradox" of the debate).
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federal policies through the states thus limits the scope of the debate,
such that many central issues that could be debated are avoided.
This feature of channeling a national debate is not unique to the
debate on slavery but is instead the result of the federal structure of
our constitutional government. The Constitution limits the scope of a
debate that has been channeled to a nonfederal locus by foreclosing
particular issues from regulation - and thus, largely, discussion - at the
state and local level.' In the fugitive slave context, for example,
Northern states did not directly dispute Southern states had the right
to designate slaves as property (which was well-settled law), but
instead urged their own right to have no part in returning slaves to
their owners.' The scope of a national debate held on the state level,
therefore, is necessarily limited to those areas in which a state can at
least arguably act in a constitutional manner.
In regards to immigration, the same limited scope is seen in the
Arizona litigation. Arizona has been careful not to challenge the
federal government's exclusive authority over immigration matters.'
Instead, it has sought to act within its police powers to affect the
federal policy in a way that is at least arguably constitutional. More
interesting, however, is that SB 1070's effect on the national debate
has taken the focus away from efforts for comprehensive federal
reform. Rather than debate what the correct federal immigration
policy, level of funding, or level of enforcement are, the litigation has
narrowed the debate to what the appropriate level of assistance a
state can withhold or provide to enforce the federal laws as they stand.
This is not to say that no discussion of federal reform does (or will)
take place but only to suggest that the locus of debate has shifted to a
narrower scope and more localized place.' This does mean, however,
that the debate in its current form is unlikely to produce any definitive
conclusion to the broader questions in the immigration debate.
3. Implications of channeling for the Supreme Court.
The nature of national debates over federal policies channeled to
states, as shown by the antebellum debate, demonstrates that litigation
like Arizona ought to be resolved by the Court in a narrow way. The
157 See id at 340-43 (discussing one central way the Constitution shaped the slavery debate
was through shared understandings of what disputes it settles).
15 See id at 341-44.
159 See note 136 and accompanying text.
160 Consider NY Times, Editorial, Immigration and Emigration (Feb 2, 2011), online at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/ilimmigration-and-emigration/
index.html (visited May 11, 2011) (describing the immigration debate as dormant following the
last attempt at comprehensive reform before being revitalized by the passage of SB 1070).
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nature of the broader debate out of which these legal questions have
arisen means that the Court will weigh in on a highly polarized
political controversy in a way that only tangentially reaches the actual
cause for debate but could have profound repercussions on it. Prigg
and its consequences demonstrate this by showing that in these
channeling situations the Court is unlikely to be able to definitively
resolve the dispute but is instead placed in a situation where profound
and unintended consequences are likely.
Justice Story, an ardent nationalist, wrote the opinion of the Prigg
Court to maximize the power of the federal government."' This
ambitious and broad approach, however, failed to either definitively
resolve the enforcement question or strengthen the supremacy of the
federal government. This happened in part because his nationalist
approach forced Story to discuss matters not directly before the
Court."' Specifically, the discussion on the broader questions about the
relationship of federal and state governments compelled him to
hypothesize that states could opt out of assistance with the
enforcement of the federal law"' and that the federal government
could not mandate cooperation."6 This language provided Northern
states the opening they needed to undermine the federal fugitive slave
laws to such an extent that they further undermined federal authority
and increased sectional tensions"'-the complete opposite effect from
what Story desired.
This failure of Prigg to resolve the fugitive slave debate is helpful
for the modern courts in at least two ways. First, the decision shows
the perils of overly ambitious decisions given their propensity for
unintended consequences." Second, and more particular to debates
channeled into the question of state-level enforcement, Prigg provides
an example of state behavior in situations where the states are seeking
to influence underlying federal policies not at issue in the decision.
161 Finkelman, 1994 S Ct Rev at 290-92 (cited in note 42) (using personal letters from
Justice Story to a United States senator to conclude that Story was motivated by "the
aggrandizement of federal power" in Prigg rather than the desire to provide a backdoor way to
end slavery).This was not the only approach possible. Story could have, for instance, reached the
same conclusions through a narrower decision that instead emphasized owners' property rights,
as urged by Chief Justice Taney. See Prigg, 41 US (16 Pet) at 627-28 (Taney concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Taney's approach would have had the benefit of avoiding the sensitive
issues about state and federal relations.
162 See Finkelman, 25 Civil War Hist at 14 (cited in note 52) (explaining that the logic of
Story's nationalist position forced him to conclude that states did not have to enforce the
Fugitive Slave Clause).
163 See Prigg, 41 US (16 Pet) at 622,625.
16 See id at 615-16.
165 See notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
166 Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich L Rev 353,362-64 (2006).
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The states, unsurprisingly, took full advantage of any leeway provided
by the Court to fulfill their own policy goals.
It might be argued that the issue with Story's opinion is not that
he sought to resolve the broader questions but that he sought to
resolve them in the particular way he did. That is, he reached the
wrong conclusion. After all, Northern states might have taken just as
much advantage of silence as they did ambiguity. Under this theory,
Story perhaps should have used the same broad approach but instead
ruled definitively in the other direction by simply stating (as Taney's
dissent insisted he had) that the federal government had exclusive
authority, foreclosing any state assistance.
Though this criticism holds some truth-states likely would have
taken advantage of such silence-it misses the larger point: the
channeling aspect of these debates necessarily and drastically limits
both the knowledge available to the Court and the means with which
it can act. These limitations make any attempt to create a generalized
rule extremely difficult, because the legal issue before the Court is but
one small aspect of a larger debate, requiring much more information
than the Court will have before it to resolve. That is to say, the
channeled nature of this debate left Story no guidance as to which of
the two choices he ought to have taken. Hindsight might tell us that
Story should have made a different ruling to achieve his nationalist
goals, but we can prescribe that only because we now know how the
broader coalitions at work reacted to the decision.
These insights should caution the Court against a broader
decision that might attempt to settle the definitive authority of the
federal government on immigration matters, as urged by some
scholars. A broader solution like this might appear wise on its face,
but like Prigg, it would have profound implications for issues not
directly before the Court. For example, a holding that forecloses any
state action that interferes with the federal enforcement regime would
not only preempt SB 1070 but also strongly imply that sanctuary
jurisdictions are unconstitutional because they also alter the
enforcement regime-a result that at a minimum may not be intended
and that is also not obviously desirable.
A narrower decision, however, would avoid the possibility of
unintended consequences because sharply focusing on the merits of
the enforcement-remedy distinction made by Arizona would diminish
the likelihood both of ambiguities in language and of impacts on
167 See, for example, Gabriel J. Chin, et al, A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona
Senate Bill 1070, 25 Georgetown Immig L J 47, 77 (2010) (framing the question of SB 1070's
validity broadly as one that focuses on the exclusiveness of federal authority over immigration).
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matters not before the court (such as the legality of sanctuary
jurisdictions, which may not conflict in the same way with federal law
as Arizona's law). This is particularly important given that, as
mentioned above, the Prigg experience demonstrates that local and
state governments would surely exploit any such ambiguities in their
favor and that the information before the Court will be severely
limited. Indeed, the Court's decision is likely only to create a baseline
from which further state policymaking will take place." The fugitive
slave debate, therefore, demonstrates that the Court ought to avoid a
broad ruling on enforcement of immigration laws but instead favor a
narrower holding, resolving only the question before it: the
uncertainty surrounding the ability of states to enforce federal law by
increasing the use of state resources to arrest, detain, and prosecute
those in violation of the law.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the underlying cause
of the dispute in Arizona will not actually be before the Court.
Instead, because of the nature of the debate, the underlying policy
differences will remain hidden behind the collateral issues that do
make it into the court system. Only Congress, the sole institution that
can reach these fundamental policy differences, can provide a
definitive solution to them. Resolution of the sectional conflict over
slavery ultimately had to be resolved through legislation, the Civil
War, and finally constitutional amendment. With respect to the
fugitive slave debate, the prewar solution to the enforcement question
came from the passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act as part of the
Compromise of 1850 rather than the Court's decision in Prigg or later
cases."' Absent a secession movement over immigration, the only
method to resolve the immigration debate will be through
congressional compromise.
CONCLUSION
The fugitive slave and immigration debates share two unique
characteristics -debate through varied levels of enforcement at the
state and local level, and common legal questions derived from
similarly situated persons. This makes the antebellum debate uniquely
relevant to the current immigration debate over the role states have in
enforcing federal immigration law. The antebellum debate provides
historical precedent for laws like Arizona's SB 1070 by establishing
168 See Beth M. Henschen and Edward I. Sidlow, The Supreme Court and the Congressional
Agenda-Setting Process, 5 J L & Polit 685,719-24 (1989).
169 See Morris, Free Men All at 131 (cited in note 40) (describing the 1850 Fugitive Slave
Act as one part of the Compromise of 1850).
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enforcement through the arrest and detention for prosecution as a
concept separate from enforcement through separate state remedies.
But the consequences of this precedent show that interference from
differing levels of local enforcement through arrest and detention
interfere with federal laws to a degree not generally permitted.
Considered as a whole, Prigg and the fugitive slave debate thus
provide powerful historical evidence that the federal government's
argument for a respect of federal balancing is a powerful one that
requires SB 1070 to be found preempted. Finally, the antebellum and
immigration debates show the unique nature of national debates over
federal policies that are channeled into the states. Analysis of the
debates shows when channeling to states is likely to take place, the
narrowing effect it has on debates, and that resolutions that the Court
reaches for immigration enforcement cases should be modest, clear,
and made with the understanding that the issues before it are only
collateral to the core conflict.
This Comment has shown that the current immigration debate
over enforcement is not unprecedented. We have been here before
and would be wise to take what we can from our past experience. The
analysis provided here has focused on United States v Arizona because
it is a current issue with which many are familiar. But this one case is
not the limit of the value provided by Prigg v Pennsylvania and the
fugitive slave debate. The antebellum debate has many more lessons
to provide. The 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, for example, includes a
unique form of encouragement for enforcing federal laws-creating
private causes of action-that have only recently begun to be used
again.' Furthermore, an additional issue of interest is the implications
Prigg has for the Tenth Amendment and recent developments in anti-
commandeering case law. The fugitive slave debate, as a crucial
stepping stone in the establishment of federal supremacy, is ultimately
an area ripe for further study that has too often been overlooked.
170 Compare 1850 Fugitive Slave Act § 5, 9 Stat 462-63 (providing slave owners, as private
citizens, the ability to bring suit against local authorities that frustrate their efforts), with SB 1070
§ 2(H)-(J), codified at Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 11-1051(H)-(J) (providing a cause of action to
private citizens against municipal authorities that "adopt[] or implement[] a policy that limits or
restricts the enforcement of federal immigration laws").
The similarities of these remedies stand in contrast to some commentators' assertion that the
provision in SB 1070 has never been tried before. See, for example, Chin, et al, 25 Georgetown
Immig L J at 75 (cited in note 167) (stating that two provisions in SB 1070 H§ 2(H)-(J) are
"previously unknown in United States law").
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